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Abstract
This article addresses two important issues in crowd-sourcing: ex ante uncertainty about
the quality and cost of different workers and strategic behaviour. We present a novel multi-
dimensional auction that incentivises the workers to make partial enquiry into the task and
to honestly report quality-cost estimates based on which the crowdsourcer can choose the
worker that offers the best value for money. The mechanism extends second score auction
design to settings where the quality is uncertain and it provides incentives to both collect
information and deliver desired qualities.
Keywords: Crowdsourcing; Multi-dimensional auctions; Yardstick competition; Score
functions
1. Introduction
The unprecedented scale of social interaction in the Internet has allowed people from
different parts of the world to collaborate or compete for the completion of various projects.
The process of enlisting humans on-line to complete tasks has been labelled ’crowd-sourcing ’,
and there are several Internet platforms supporting such processes, cf. e.g. [12]. They include
Topcoder for software coding, Freelancer for photo moderation and tagging, MTurk for data
clean-up and translations among others, and Innocentive for scientific research.
Simplifying a detailed definition in [13], we will think of crowd-sourcing’ .. as a process
whereby individuals propose to a group of individuals, via a flexible open call, the voluntary
undertaking of a task’. Those proposing a task are typically referred as ’crowd-sourcers’
and their target group as the ’crowd’ or the ’workers’. Those of the crowd who end up
participating in the project can receive a type of reward depending on the terms of the crowd-
sourcers, while the crowd-sourcers get to utilise the crowd’s labour. Tasks vary with respect
to the used platform, with some platforms providing the development tools for breaking
a complex task to its components. For example, the CrowdForge framework manages the
breakdown of complex tasks in MTurk, such as the writing of an article or market research
to its sub-tasks, while it takes care of the emerging dependencies among the different tasks
and their corresponding workers [24].
∗Corresponding author. Email address pb.eco@cbs.dk (P. Bogetoft)
Preprint submitted to Some Journal April 9, 2013
Although crowd-sourcing can increase productivity by turning the world into one virtual
working place, it also has some less favourable aspects. Crowd-sourcing, shares with the
rest of the Internet, the existence of many layers of malicious behaviour. The most common
manifestation of such behaviour involves workers chosing to produce work of sub-standard
quality i.e. deliberately not meeting the crowd-sourcers publicly announced requirements.
Some of the several documented cases where such behaviour occur include Taskcn, the Chi-
nese crowd-sourcing platform, where it is common for members of the crowd to mis-represent
their quality by biding for difficult and complex tasks assuming it will be easier to get se-
lected due to lower competition occurring in complex projects, while others will bid for
several projects hoping that they will be selected for a few [37]. Likewise, in MTurk and
specifically for more complex tasks it is known for crowd-workers to generate results of lower
quality when compared with specialists i.e. comparison of MTurk workers and Wikipedia
administrators in rating Wikipedia articles [23].
Solutions to the crowd’s strategic behaviour are already in place, albeit very basic. For
example, in MTurk the crowd-sourcers can reject a completed assignment and consequently
refuse payment to the worker if they are not satisfied by the final result. It is apparent that
existing crowd-sourcing systems have not benefited as much as other sectors of internet-
based commerce by the advancements in trust and reputation systems (survey of the related
literature in [32, 19]), but they also lack the structure that will allow such breakthroughs. We
introduce this structure through the use of Mechanism Design [26] and particularly Auction
Theory [25] to model the interactions between the crowd-sourcer (principal) and the workers
(agents) and design a payment scheme that incentivises honest reporting and production
of appropriate quality, after the workers have invested sufficient resources (i.e. time) in
determining their quality. We assume that workers operate in an environment of uncertainty
where they report to the crowd-sourcer the distribution of their production.
As a starting point, we address the crowd-sourcing problem as a multi-dimensional pro-
curement auction. Single-dimensional auctions have been widely used to procure a given
service from the supplier with the lowest cost[35, 16, 10]. However, multi-dimensional auc-
tions are more useful when the service can take many forms, since they take into account not
only the price but also the service characteristics or quality when selecting a winner. This
is well-suited for crowd-sourcing, where even simple tasks may have several parameters. A
software application may for example depend on responsiveness, usability of interface and
resource management. In his seminal paper Che [8] designed a series of multi-dimensional
auctions (first score, second score and second preferred score) to address such cases where the
quality of a product is of equal importance to its cost. In these auctions, suppliers report their
production quality and the associated costs, and the mechanism maps the multi-dimensional
bid into a single-dimensional quantity, named as ’score’. All three auctions are incentive
compatible, and based on the assumption that costs are independently distributed, while
the first and second score auctions implement the socially optimal (allocatively efficient)
outcome. The assumption regarding the distribution of costs was relaxed by Branco [5] who
introduced a two-stage optimal multi-dimensional auction in a setting in which there was
correlation among suppliers’ costs. A mechanism proposed by Bogetoft and Nielsen [4] fur-
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ther exploited the correlations among the costs of different agents through the introduction
of a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA [6, 7]) based competition.
Despite the fact that score auctions emerged from the need for more efficient govern-
ment procurement, there are also several links with Computer Science and in particular
with applications in multi-agent systems and e-commerce [17]. Bichler[2] paves the way for
possible e-commerce applications of multi-dimensional auctions by showing that they result
in significantly higher utility when compared to single-dimensional auctions in a web-based
experimental setting. Furthermore, Beil and Wein [1] propose an iterative mechanism in
which the buyer sequentially estimates each bidder’s cost function through a series of score
auctions. Parkes and Kalagnanam [31] also propose an iterative multi-attribute procurement
price-based auction in which suppliers in each round submit their bids and a winner maxi-
mizing the buyer’s preference is selected. They show that their mechanism terminates with
a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves allocation. Furthermore, multi-dimensional auctions can
also be applied in settings where multiple suppliers are necessary to satisfy the principal’s
demand [3].
Now, although these approaches address effectively specific issues, they do not combine
all the elements we require. Most importantly, the literature does not take into account
the real world challenge of ensuring truthful reporting when there is uncertainty about the
quality and of ensuring the final production when this cannot be fully controlled. In cases
where there is no uncertainty, it is assumed that the principal can enforce the agents to
truthfully report their production quality, through the use of external means. In the few
cases where the possibility of misreporting is considered it is explicitly stated that the auction
will be cancelled, or an extremely heavy fine will be issued to the winner of the auction if
the observed output deviates from its report. Obviously, such an approach does not work
when quality is uncertain.
This multi-layered challenge can be addressed by incorporating a strictly proper scoring
rule payment in a multi-dimensional auction. Strictly proper scoring rules are designed to
elicit accurate predictions by rewarding forecasters based on how close the actual outcome is
to their prediction[33, 18, 14]. Strictly proper scoring rules have been widely used in mech-
anism design to elicit accurate information and in particular for the design of reputation
systems to promote truthful reporting of feedback regarding the quality of a service expe-
rienced [20, 21, 22]. Furthermore, Miller et al. [27, 28] have shown how an appropriately
scaled strictly proper scoring rule can be used to incentivise agents to invest costly resources
when generating their forecasts. Extensions are given in [30] and [36], and a brief summary
of the main insights used in this paper is provided in Section 3.
In this paper we combine elements from multi-dimensional auctions and information
elicitation mechanisms. We consider a setting where the worker is not certain of the quality
of its future production when reporting it to the crowd-sourcer. Workers base their beliefs
on initial expectations and costly investigations modelled as the observation of a sample
of independent Gaussian distributions. After the auction is completed the winner starts
working on its assigned task and the crowd-sourcer observes the outcome after the work is
finished. Based on this observation and the initial report, the crowd-sourcer penalises the
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selected worker (winner) for any deviation from its report, while compensating the worker’s
actual cost and quality.
We provide solid theoretical results as we prove the economic properties of our mechanism
i.e. incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We also show that in expectation our
mechanism achieves the outcome of the second score auction in which agents are able to di-
rectly report their actual quality outcomes, and that agents invest the maximum amount of
resources available to them in order to generate precise estimates of their qualities. Finally,
we numerically evaluate our mechanism though simulations, where we discuss its computa-
tional aspects and demonstrate its convergence to the outcome of the second score auction.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we describe the setting in more
details, and in Section 3 we provide the background relevant to strictly proper scoring rules.
In Section 4 we define the mechanism, while in Section 5 we outline the economic properties.
In Section 6 we evaluate the mechanism though numerical simulations and in Section 7 we
conclude.
2. The Context
We consider a principal (the crowd-sourcer) interested in procuring a task or a service
from one of N rational and risk neutral agents (the crowd or the workers). The provided task
or service may be an independent task or part of a more comlex one, without this affecting
our analysis, and is characterised by multiple parameters defined by an s-dimensional vector
of qualities yi0 ∈ Rs with yi0 > 0 and i ∈ I = {1, . . . N}. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that for each agent the parameters of its service can be aggregated in one variable, hence
each agent has a single quality profile denoted by yi0.
We depart from existing literature by introducing uncertainty regarding agent’s qualities.
We model uncertainty by assuming that N rational and risk neutral agents will attempt to
estimate their individual productions yi0 with i ∈ {1, ..., N} by generating a sample of M
independent observations yij each with j ∈ {1, ...,M}.In more detail, agents do not know
their quality ex ante but instead have a priori beliefs and can collect additional information.
Since Gaussian distributions are commonly used in the data fusion literature [15, 11], we will
also use them to model the agents’ stochastic outputs and the data collection. We assume
that the agent i’s a priori belief about yi0 is given y
i
0 ∼ N (yiµ, 1/θiµ), and that he is able to
collect further information about yi0 by generating M independent and identically distributed
random observations {yi1, yi2, ... , yiM} with yij ∼ N (yi0, 1/θi0). Using these observations, the
agent can update the a priori beliefs to the posterior belief
yi0 ∼ N (
yiµθ
i
µ + θ
iy¯i
θiµ + θ
i
,
1
θiµ + θ
i
) (1)
where y¯i is the mean of the observations {yi1, yi2, ... , yiM} and θi the resulting precision of the
sample average y¯i, equal to Mθi0.
It is natural to assume that the cost of collecting information about the likely quality
will increase as the precision θi increases, hence we model data collection cost ci(θi) as a
4
Figure 1: The time-line of the game.
convex, increasing and double differentiable function such as c(θ) = Ciθ2, where Ci > 0 is
a parameter which represents different base costs for each agent. Typically, costs in data
collection introduce constraints in the overall precision since it will be impossible to have
an infinite sample, or to have a finite sample of very costly observations. This constraint is
denoted as θi ≤ θi∗.
Now, regarding the production costs, we follow existing literature [8] by assuming that
agents are capable of producing different levels of outputs, and that in order to produce
the quality yi0 agent i needs inputs which depend on each agent’s efficiencies. These inputs
are the costs involved in production and should not be confused with the costs involved in
the estimation of the quality. Here, costs are private information to each agent and cannot
be verified by any third party (i.e. the principal or other agents). The cost agent i faces
in the production of its quality is modelled as a function of quality yi0 and is denoted as
xi(yi0, l
i), where li represents the agents’ private information about their production cost
efficiency. While agents are aware of their cost parameters, the principal has only access
to their distribution. We assume that li is independently and identically distributed over
[l, l] with 0 < l < l < +∞ according to a distribution with positive and continuously
differentiable density function. Finally, the cost function is increasing in both quality and
the cost efficiency parameter and that is convex regarding the quality.
Based on the above, the time-line (Figure 1) of the game is as follows. Initially, each
agent collects information about his likely production quality and production costs. By
spending information collection costs ci(θi) it is able to predict its quality yi0 as (y
i
µθ
i
µ +
y¯iθi)/(θiµ+θ
i) with precision θiµ+θ
i, and the cost of the expected production as xi(yi0, l
i) . We
assume that the agent can send possibly manipulated signals about his production (quality)
level and production costs, and the precision of his prediction to the principal before the
principal decides on the provider. Let the signalled production be ŷi, the signalled data
collection effort be θ̂i, and the signalled cost be x̂i. The principal can use these signals to
choose the provider and he can use this information together with the realised production
yi0 to determine reimbursement. If the principal picks agent i as the provider, his value of
the realised quality yi0 will be given by V (y
i
0) where V (·) is increasing, concave and twice
differentiable function of the quality.
To sum up, in this setting the principal has to deal with poor quality and costs estimates
generated by agents not committing significant resources, with misreporting of the estimates
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and with incentivising the selected agent to actually produce the final outputs. The challenge
will be to design a mechanism that will induce the agents to commit resources to generating
their estimates, and truthfully report them, and to actually produce the desired quality.
3. Strictly Proper Scoring Rules
Before turning to the details of the mechanism, it is convenient to discuss the simpler
problem of inducing agents to collect information about their production and reveal their
findings.
So-called strictly proper scoring rules are used as a tool for eliciting forecasters’ beliefs
of future events in various domains ranging from meteorology and weather forecasting to
computer science and online trust and reputation systems. Such scoring rules incentivise a
risk neutral forecaster to truthfully report its forecast by maximizing its expected reward.
Imagine that a forecaster, whose belief of the outcome of an event y is generated by a
probability density function Q(y), reports a probability distribution R(y). The forecaster’s
expected score will be:
S(Q,R) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Q(y)S(y|R)dy (2)
and a scoring rule is defined as strictly proper if its expected value is maximised on truthful
reporting i.e. S(Q,Q) ≥ S(Q,R) for all R. Due to this property, a payment based on such
a scoring rule can create incentives for truthful behaviour for utility maximizing agents.
The four most popular strictly proper scoring rules considered by the literature are the
quadratic, spherical, logarithmic and the parametric family, known as the power rule fam-
ily [34]. For the special case where an agent’s posterior belief of its quality y0 is represented
by a Gaussian distribution N (y, 1/θ) and its report is (ŷ, θ̂) the four strictly proper scoring
rules, S(y0; ŷ, θ̂), take the following forms:
1. Quadratic: 2N (y0; ŷ, 1/θ̂)− 1
2
√
θ̂
pi
2. Spherical:
(
4pi
θ̂
) 1
4
N (y0; ŷ, 1/θ̂)
3. Logarithmic: logN (y0; ŷ, 1/θ̂)
4. Parametric: kN (y0; ŷ, θ)(k−1) − k − 1√
k
(
2pi
θ̂
) 1−k
2
where k ∈ (1, 3), and when k = 2 the parametric rule takes the form of the quadratic rule.
Now, as already discussed in the introduction, agents’ strategic behaviour can have mul-
tiple layers. For example, in terms of the crowd-sourcing scenario, a worker may attempt
to manipulate the crowd-sourcer by not committing a realistic amount of resources in gen-
erating its estimate, as well as by misreporting its estimate of its production quality and its
precision. Therefore, it is interesting to note that strictly proper scoring rules not only can
6
guarantee truthful reporting, but also guarantee sufficient data collection effort on behalf
of the agents. This process is described by Miller et. [27] who note that through an affine
transformation α+ βS of a strictly proper scoring rule S it is possible to induce an agent to
make and truthfully report an estimate at a specific precision, while not compromising the
incentive compatibility property.
Let the payment that an agent expects to receive, P (θ), be:
P (θ) = αS(θ) + β
where α and β are the scaling parameters of an affine transformation, θ is the agent’s true
precision and S(θ) the expected score which can be easily calculated by integrating over the
above expressions of the four scoring rules. Parameter α guarantees the estimate will be
generated at that precision, while β compensates the agent for the cost of its estimate.
Specifically in our model, θ is equal to θµ + θ
′, with θµ being the precision of the agent’s
prior belief and θ′ the precision of the sample average. The expected utility to an agent net
of data collection costs is therefore:
U(θ′) = αS(θ′) + β − c(θ′)
Now, if there is a constraint θ∗ in the agent’s precision (i.e. θ′ ≤ θ∗), it is on the best interest
of a principal solely interested in data collection to elicit an estimate at that maximum
precision. Hence, the principal will choose a value for α so that the agent’s precision is equal
to θ∗. That is, the principal selects an α which maximises the agent’s expected utility at θ∗.
To do so, it solves
dU
dθ′
∣∣∣
θ∗
= 0 to give:
α =
c′(θ∗)
S
′
(θ∗)
(3)
The β parameter serves only to ensure participation in the mechanism by ensuring that
their expected utility is always positive. Presuming that the expected utility from the data
collection and reporting alone shall be at least 0 we get
β = c(θ∗)− c
′(θ∗)
S
′
(θ∗)
S(θ∗) (4)
Based on Equations 3 and 4 we calculate the specific formulas of parameters α and β
depending on which one of the strictly proper scoring rule is used. This raises the important
issue of which rule should be selected by the principal. Indeed, each one of the aforementioned
four strictly proper scoring rules has additional properties, besides incentivising truthful
reporting and eliciting effort if appropriately scaled. For example, the logarithmic scoring
rule and the parametric one for k → 1 lead to the lowest expected payments, but they
have no lower bounds. It is suggested by Papakonstantinou’s comparison of the four strictly
proper scoring rules [29] that the parametric scoring rule offers a good compromise. Selecting
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a value for the parameter k within (1, 1.5) keeps the payment relatively low for the majority
of the agents, while the existence of a finite lower bound protects the agents who generate
inaccurate estimates (N → 0). For the parametric rule parameters α and β are denoted as
follows:
α =
2c′(θ∗)(θµ + θ∗)
√
k
k − 1
(
θµ + θ
∗
2pi
) 1−k
2
(5)
and
β = c(θ∗)− 2(θµ + θ
∗)
k − 1 c
′(θ∗) (6)
4. The Mechanism
Our proposed mechanism implements a two-step payment to the winner of a second
score auction based on the agents’ reported beliefs of their qualities. The first payment to
the winner is equal to the second score auction’s payment based on that reported belief
and is received before the actual production. Once that agent produces its quality and its
observed by the principal, it receives its secondary payment. This payment consists of the
three following parts:
1. A symmetric penalty if the selected agent produced an inaccurate report.
2. A compensation for the costs involved in the generation of the estimate based on its
accuracy.
3. A compensation for the selected agent’s production based on the realised quality.
We introduce a scaled strictly proper scoring rule to evaluate the selected agent’s prob-
abilistic estimate. Although the use of scoring rules does not guarantee that the selected
agent’s reported belief will be close to its actual production, since an agent’s sample can al-
ways include a significant number of poor observations, it does motivate the agent to invest
all its available resources when generating its estimate and then to truthfully report it.
The mechanism is formally defined as follows:
1. Principal asks N agents to participate in the procurement auction by asking them to
report their constraint θi∗.
2. Agents generate and report estimates of their outputs yi, their precision θ̂i, and their
costs (x̂i, for i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
3. Each bid is assigned with a score Ŝi = S(x̂
i, ŷi) = V (ŷi)− x̂i, for i ∈ {1, ..., N}
4. The agent with the highest score wins the auction and is allocated the project.
5. The winner1 agent receives its first payment from the principal: P̂ = V (ŷ) − Ŝ(2)
similar to the payment in a second score auction.
6. Winning agent produces quality y0.
1In order to simplify our notation we omit the use of subscript (1) to denote the winner of the auction,
while we maintain the use of (2) for the runner-up agent.
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7. Principal observes winning agent’s quality production and issues the second payment:
B(y0; ŷ, θ̂) = d(y0; ŷ, θ̂)[V (ŷ)− Ŝ(2)] + αS(y0; ŷ, θ̂) + β + [V (y0)− Ŝ(2)]
where d(y0; ŷ, θ̂) is a function that evaluates the selected agent’s reported estimate
based on the observed actual production, parameters α and β are the eliciting effort
parameters for the scaled strictly proper scoring rule S(y0; ŷ, θ̂), and S(2) is the score
of the runner up agent in the initial second score auction (Step 5).
The function d(·) serves to guarantee truthful reporting by penalising deviation from
truth telling. Since an agent’s report can deviate from its actual production due to unforeseen
circumstances (inherent poor observations) and due to strategic behaviour as well, we let the
deviation function d(·) be based on a scaled strictly proper scoring rule which elicits truthful
behaviour and maximises agent’s effort. The function is defined as following:
d(y0; ŷ, θ̂) = S(y0; ŷ, θ̂)− S(θ̂∗)− 1 (7)
where θ̂∗ is the agent’s reported constraint, S(y0; ŷ, θ̂) is the scoring rule and S(θ̂∗) is the
expected score as a function of the reported constraint θ̂∗.
The total payment a truthful agent expects to derive by this mechanism is the following:
P (θ) = [S(θ)− S(θ̂∗)][V (y)− S(2)] + αS(θ)− β + V (y0)− S(2) (8)
In the following section, where we prove the mechanism’s economic properties, we also
show in detail how the above expression is derived.
5. Economic Properties
Having described in detail the mechanism, we now identify and prove its economic prop-
erties. Specifically we show that:
1. Agents are incentivised to generate their estimates at their reported maximum preci-
sions, and truthfully report their quality and its precision.
2. Truthful revelation of agents’ costs is a weakly dominant strategy given a truthful
report of an agent’s estimate and a precision equal to its reported maximum.
3. The mechanism is immune to the effects of combined strategic behaviour (if it occurs).
4. The mechanism is individually rational for the selected agent (auction winner).
Lemma 1. Truthful revelation of the selected agent’s estimate of its quality is a dominant
stategy with the estimate’s precision being equal to the reported constraint.
Proof. We show that truthful revelation of the selected agent’s reported quality is a dominant
strategy by showing that its expected utility is maximised on truthful reporting, while its
precision is equal to its reported maximum precision.
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The selected agent’s utility is the following:
U(ŷ) = V (ŷ)−S(2)+[S(y0; ŷ, θ̂)−S(θ̂∗)−1][V (ŷ)−S(2)]+αS(y0; ŷ, θ̂)+β+V (y0)+S(2)−x(y0)−c(θ)
where α and β are the strictly proper scoring rules scaling parameters defined in Section 3.
By integrating over the set of possible outputs y0 we derive the winner’s expected utility:
U(ŷ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
N (y0; y, 1/θ)[V (ŷ)− S(2)]dy0
+
∫ ∞
−∞
N (y0; y, 1/θ)[S(y0; ŷ, θ̂)− S(θ̂∗)− 1][V (ŷ)− S(2)]dy0
+
∫ ∞
−∞
N (y0; y, 1/θ)[αS(y0; ŷ, θ̂) + β]dy0
+
∫ ∞
−∞
N (y0; y, 1/θ)[V (y0) + S(2) − x(y0)− c(θ)]dy0
Given that the initial payment does not depend on the final outcome and based on the
definition of probability
∫∞
−∞N (y0; y, 1/θ) = 1 a simpler expression can be derived:
U(ŷ, θ̂) = [V (ŷ)− S(2)]
∫ ∞
−∞
N (y0; y, 1/θ)[S(y0; ŷ, θ̂)− S(θ̂∗)]dy0
+
∫ ∞
−∞
αN (y0; y, 1/θ)S(y0; ŷ, θ̂)dy0 + β − c(θ) +
∫ ∞
−∞
N (y0; y, 1/θ)[V (y0)− x(y0)]dy0 + S(2)
The above expression can be further simplified through the use of the notation of the
expected score:
S(N̂ ,N ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
N (y0; y, 1/θ)S(y0; ŷ, 1/θ̂)dy0
where N̂ represents the distribution of the selected agent’s reported estimates and N the
distribution of its true estimates.
To sum up, the selected agent’s selected utility is expressed as following:
U(ŷ, θ̂) = [V (ŷ)− S(2)][S(N̂ ,N )− S(θ̂∗)] + αS(N̂ ,N ) + β
+
∫ ∞
−∞
N (y0; y, 1/θ)[V (y0)− x(y0)]dy0 + S(2) − c(θ)
Due to the use of a strictly proper scoring rule, the expected scoring rule is maximised
at N̂ = N , hence (y, θ) is a local maximum for the expected score. Also, in Section 3 we
have defined the parameters α and β so that the principal elicits the estimate at a precision
equal to the agent’s maximum capability, θ∗. Based on these two properties, the partial
derivatives of S(N̂ ,N ) w.r.t ŷ and θ̂ are equal to 0, for (ŷ, θ̂) = (y, θ∗), when θ = θ∗.
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That is, the precision the agent reports after generating its estimate, is in fact its reported
constraint, with the estimate’s actual precision being also equal to that constraint.
In order to show that (y, θ∗) is a maximum point, we first show that it is a critical one
by proving that
∂U
∂ŷ
= 0 and
∂U
∂θ̂
= 0:
∂U
∂ŷ
= V ′(ŷ)[S(N̂ ,N )− S(θ̂∗)] + [V (ŷ)− S(2) + α]∂S(N̂ ,N )
∂ŷ
= 0 (9)
∂U
∂θ̂
= [V (ŷ)− S(2) + α]∂S(N̂ ,N )
∂θ̂
= 0 (10)
S is a strictly proper scoring rule, hence solving the above two equations identifies (y, θ∗)
as a critical point since
∂S(N̂ ,N )
∂ŷ
=
∂S(N̂ ,N )
∂θ̂
= 0 for (ŷ, θ̂) = (y, θ∗)
After calculating
∂2U
∂ŷ2
,
∂2U
∂θ̂2
,
∂2U
∂ŷ∂θ̂
and
∂2U
∂θ̂∂ŷ
for (ŷ, θ̂) = (y, θ∗). The determinant of the
Hessian matrix is the following:
Det(H(U))(y, θ∗) = [V (y)− S(2) + α]2[∂
2S
∂ŷ2
∂2S
∂θ̂2
− ∂
2S
∂ŷ∂θ̂
∂2S
∂θ̂∂ŷ
] =
= [V (y)− S(2) + α]2Det(H(S))(y, θ∗) (11)
which is positive given that [V (y)− S(2) + α]2 > 0 and Det(H(S))(y, θ∗) > 0 since (y, θ)
is a maximum for the expected score S and θ = θ∗.
Having demonstrated that (y, θ∗) is a maximum for U(ŷ, θ̂) given that θ̂ = θ we have
shown that truthful revelation of an agent’s quality and its precision is a dominant strategy
and that the agent is incentivised to generate its estimate at a precision equal to its reported
constraint.
However, we haven’t discussed the agent’s incentives regarding its reported constraint.
Naturaly, the fact that it is a constraint suggests that the agent will not be able to generate
an estimate at a higher precision and it would not be reasonable to report a precision higher
than the actual constraint. Also, by generating its estimate at a lower precision, θ′, s.t.
θ′ < θ∗, there is a loss in the expected score, since S(θ′) < S(θ∗), hence the penalty in
the secondary payment increased, which in turn reduces its overal utility. This leads to the
following corollary:
Corollary 1. Agents report their true constraint at the beginning of the mechanism, since
they expect to maximise their utility by doing so, if they win the auction.
Lemma 2. Truthful revelation of the agents’ costs is a weakly dominant strategy given that
their reported outputs are equal to their reports.
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Proof. A truthful selected agent expects the following utility:
U(y) =
∫ ∞
−∞
N (y0; y, 1/θ)[V (y0)− x(y0)]dy0 − S(2)
Representing the Gaussian probability distribution as the Dirac delta function, leads to
a transformation which simplifies the above expression. The transformation is based on the
property of the Dirac delta function:
∫∞
−∞ f(y0)δ(y0 − y)dy0 = f(y), where f(y0) is equal
to V (y0)− x(y0) and δ(y0 − y) = 1√
2√
θ
√
pi
exp (−θ(y0 − ŷ)2/2), with the Dirac delta function
δα(y) =
1
α
√
pi
exp(−y2/α2), and α =
√
2√
pi
.
Now it is possible to replace
∫∞
−∞N (y0; y, 1/θ)[V (y0)− x(y0)]dy0 with V (y)− x(y) which
is in fact the selected agent’s true parameters. Hence:
U(y) = V (y)− x(y)− S(2) = S(1) − S(2)
Given this insight, we prove the Lemma by contradiction:
Let x and y be an agent’s true cost and quality, and S the score that corresponds to
these true values, while x̂, ŷ and Ŝ the reported ones. Furthermore, let x(2), y(2), S(2) be the
bids, and the score of the runner up agent (i.e. Ŝ > S(2)).
First, let the agent’s misreporting have an effect on the outcome of the auction. We
consider the following two cases:
1. Agent wins by misreporting while it would have lost if truthful.
2. Agent loses by misreporting while it would have won if truthful.
• In Case (1) agent reports its cost s.t Ŝ > S(2) given that S < S(2). The agent achieves
this by reporting a lower cost than its actual one i.e. x̂ < x. Under optimal reporting
of quality, the utility of an agent misreporting its cost in Case (1) will be negative i.e.
U(y) = V (y)− x(y)− S(2) = S(1) − S(2) < 0.
• In Case (2) agent reports its cost s.t. Ŝ < S(2) given that S > S(2). The agent would
have won the auction, but instead reports a cost greater than its actual one i.e. x̂ > x.
As a result, the agent loses the auction and consequently receives negative utility (since
it still faces the costs of determining its quality).
Second, we assume that the agent misreports its cost of production without this affecting
whether it wins the auction or not. If the agent had already lost the auction, misreporting
would have no additional effect given that the utility would be negative due to the cost of
determining its quality without any dependence on the cost of production. Had the agent
already won the auction, misreporting would not result to additional benefits. Specifically,
both payments depend on the second lower score and, the reported and actually produced
(for the second stage) quality and the compensation for its estimate.
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Theorem 1. The mechanism is immune to combined misreporting of quality and cost.
Proof. In the above proofs we showed that truthful reporting of the production quality is
an optimal strategy if the agent reports truthfully its cost, and that the same holds for
an agent’s costs, given that it generated an accurate estimate of its quality by investing
the maximum amount of resources in determining it. However, given the multi-dimensional
nature of the bids an agent could attempt to manipulate the principal by misreporting both
costs while speculating on the precision of its quality’s estimate.
In this proof we examine agents’ strategic behaviour as a whole and the complexities
that arise from combining possible misreporting of production costs with an attempt to
manipulate the process by producing inaccurate reports. We will show that even when it is
possible for some type of misreporting to occur, there is no negative impact on the principal.
In order to demonstrate how it is not optimal for an agent to deviate from truthful
behaviour we consider the four following general cases of misreporting:
1. Agent wins the auction by misreporting both its estimate of quality and precision and
production cost
2. Agent wins the auction with the misreporting having no effect on the auction’s outcome
3. Agent loses the auction due to its misreporting
4. Agent loses the auction despite its misreporting
• In Case (1) the agent reports its estimate of quality and cost s.t. Ŝ > S(2), while
S < S(2), with its precision not necessarily equal to its reported constraint. We will
show that the misreporting agent’s expected utility U(ŷ, θ̂) will always be less or equal
to the utility of a truthful agent U(y, θ̂∗):
U(ŷ, θ̂)− U(y, θ̂∗) = [V (ŷ)− S(2)][S(N̂ ,N )− S(θ̂∗)] + αS(N̂ ,N ) + β − c(θ) (12)
Regarding V (ŷ)−S(2) we have assumed that it is a positive quantity since Ŝ > S(2) ⇒
V (ŷ)− x̂(ŷ) > S(2) ⇒ V (ŷ) > S(2), while S(N̂ ,N )−S(θ̂∗) is negative since S(N̂ ,N ) ≤
S(θ̂∗) given that S is a strictly proper scoring rule.
Finally, after replacing α and β it can be shown that αS(N̂ ,N ) + β − c(θ) < 0:
c′(θ̂∗)
S ′(θ̂∗)
[S(N̂ ,N )− S(θ̂∗)] + c(θ̂∗)− c(θ)
which is negative since S(N̂ ,N ) ≤ S(θ̂∗) and c(θ̂∗) − c(θ) < 0 since it is not optimal
for an agent to report a constraint lower than its intended precision if it knows that it
will be paid based on its constraint, and consequently lose by doing so.
• In Case (2) the agent would have won the auction anyway, and although misreporting
of cost and quality will have no impact on the outcome of the auction, it may have
on the secondary payment. Having shown from Case (1) that U(ŷ, θ̂) ≤ U(y, θ̂∗) is
13
enough for this case also. Even if we assume that the estimate’s precision is equal to
the reported constraint, it is still the misreporting of the estimate and the production
cost which makes this strategy suboptimal
Cases (3) and (4) are simpler. For both cases it is obvious that the utility of an agent
not winning the initial auction will solely consist of the cost of data collection. In Case (3)
the agent deliberately misreports its estimate and its production cost in order to lose. It
would be in its best interest to invest minimum resources in generating its estimate, so it can
minimise its inevitable loss. However, that is not a straightforward decision. Estimates of
low precision may end up winning the auction and inflicting additional losses, while estimates
of high precision will increase its losses. Effectively, an agent who wants to lose the auction
has no reason to participate in the auction. Now, in Case (4) the agent misreports with
the intention to win but ends up losing the auction. Had the agent won, it would result in
negative utility as shown in Case (1) and given that the agent intends to win, it will invest
maximum resources in generating its estimate, as shown in Corollary 1.
Having shown that combined misreporting of costs, estimates of qualities and their preci-
sion leads to either negative utility or a non-optimal outcome, we proved that the mechanism
is immune to this type of strategic behaviour.
Theorem 2. The mechanism is individually rational for the winning agent.
Proof. The utility an agent which has truthfully reported its estimates, its precisions and
the productions costs is given by:
U(y) = V (y)− x(y)− S(2) = S(1) − S(2)
Given that V (y)−x(y) is the selected agent’s true score, the expected utility is positive and
consequently the mechanism individually rational.
6. Numerical Evaluation
In this section we initially demonstrate how this mechanism works through an example
and then proceed to undertake a series of simulations to get a better understanding of
its performance. In order to highlight the costs of the uncertainty regarding the agents’
predictions of their output, we compare our mechanism with the standard second score
auction (SSA) where agents also report their predictions, under the assumption that the
principal can predict the same output and can enforce its supply through external means.
As a benchmark, we use the same auction under the assumption that there is no uncertainty,
that is, agents report directly their realised outcomes y0.
We consider a specific case in which the parameters yiµ of the agents’ prior beliefs of their
production qualities are drawn from the uniform distribution U(2, 5), while we assume that
the agents’ precisions in both priors and individual observations during data collection are
equal to 1. Consequently, given our model, the actual production quality level follows the
Gaussian distribution N (yiµ, 1). Furthermore, the agents’ production cost functions are given
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by xi(y) = X iy2, where X i ∼ U(0, 1), while the costs of data collection are linear functions,
given by ci(θ) = Ciθ, where C∼U(0.001, 0.002). Note that the bounds in the distribution of
the data collection cost parameter are selected so that even for relative large samples the
overall cost is relative small compared to the actual production cost. A scenario whereby
data collection cost would be higher than the production cost is not considered realistic,
since an agent would not be capable of providing such precision.
The principal’s value function is given by V (y) = B(1− e−y), with B = 20 guaranteeing
that there will be some agents with positive scores V (y) − x(y) at the range of qualities
we use. This particular value function is both increasing and concave and it provides some
curvature, as opposed to more conventional approaches such as V (y) = B
√
y which are
almost linear when B is selected in order to achieve similar results in terms of the sign of
the score.
The mechanism is simulated 105 times, while the precision of each agent’s sample average,
and consequently its sample of observations, M , ranges from 1 to 100. For each iteration we
record the selected agent’s utility, its payment by the principle, its prediction and production
costs and whether the agent selected by our mechanism is the agent that would have been
selected had there been no uncertainty (we refer to such a winner as a ’proper winner’).
For the calculations that involve a lack of uncertainty, the agents will report their actual
outcome yi0 directly. In a given iteration all agents face underlying cost functions of the same
form, but their priors, sample observations and cost parameters differ. Due to the number
of iterations the standard error in the mean values plotted is in the range of 10−4 to 10−5
and thus we omit the use of errobars for clurity.
6.1. A Snapshot of the Mechanism
For a single iteration of the mechanism, we calculate several of the mechanism’s ele-
ments i.e. winners, payments and costs as the sample’s precision increases. Specifically, in
Table 1 we list the winner of our mechanism and the winner of the second score auction
with no uncertainty, denoted as w and w′ respectively. We also calculate the parts of the
secondary payment i.e. the d function: S(y0; ŷ, θ̂)− S(θ̂∗)− 1 and the penalty for inaccura-
cies: d(y0; ŷ, θ̂)[V (ŷ)− Ŝ(2)], while listing the first and secondary payments of the mechanism
(Steps 5 and 7 respectively), the total payment and the winner’s utility. Finally, in the last
column, we list the ratio between the cost of production x(y) and data collection c(θ).
From Table 1 it can be seen that in this particular instance, at a sample precision of 4
our auction’s winner is the winner of the second score auction with no uncertainty, w = w′.
This shows that our mechanism identified the ’proper’ winner, i.e. the agent who should
have won based solely on actual production, after it generated a sample of 4 observations.
However, d() function is not equal to −1, as it is on expectation, which leads to a heavier
fine for the winner of the auction, hence the 2nd Pay, total payment and utility are negative
at some precisions. Specifically regarding the winner’s utility, it is interesting to observe
the loss of an imprecise agent, and the relation with our theoretical results in Section 5,
where we discussed how estimates of low precision may end up winning the auction but
infilicting additional losses instead of gains (Theorem 1, Case (3)). Still, despite the good
intution that this analysis provides for our mechanism, it should be noted that these results
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Table 1: A single iteration of the mechanism.
θ w w′ d() Penalty 1st Pay 2nd Pay Total P Utility Cost ratio
1 11 14 -1.5862 -1.7624 1.1111 -3.4723 -2.3612 -2.5621 110.09
4 14 14 -0.9166 -0.5276 0.5756 -0.1340 0.4417 0.0692 49.88
10 14 14 -0.9125 -0.9636 1.0560 -0.0171 1.0389 0.6554 19.95
16 14 14 -0.8846 -0.7820 0.8840 0.1577 1.0417 0.6472 12.47
22 14 14 -0.9417 -0.6751 0.7169 0.2874 1.0043 0.5989 9.07
28 14 14 -0.8786 -0.7433 0.8460 0.2266 1.0726 0.6562 7.13
34 14 14 -0.9168 -0.9277 1.0119 0.0906 1.1024 0.6751 5.87
40 14 14 -0.9382 -0.9601 1.0233 0.0581 1.0814 0.6430 4.99
46 14 14 -0.9213 -0.9190 0.9975 0.1251 1.1225 0.6732 4.34
52 14 14 -0.8727 -0.8030 0.9201 0.3023 1.2224 0.7621 3.84
58 14 14 -0.9004 -0.7504 0.8334 0.3573 1.1907 0.7194 3.44
64 14 14 -0.8758 -0.7663 0.8750 0.3885 1.2635 0.7812 3.12
70 14 14 -0.8820 -0.7550 0.8561 0.4070 1.2631 0.7698 2.85
76 14 14 -0.8658 -0.7755 0.8958 0.4239 1.3197 0.8154 2.63
82 14 14 -0.8671 -0.7665 0.8840 0.4551 1.3391 0.8239 2.43
88 14 14 -0.8638 -0.7765 0.8990 0.4678 1.3668 0.8406 2.27
94 14 14 -0.8645 -0.7864 0.9096 0.4791 1.3887 0.8515 2.12
100 14 14 -0.8687 -0.7578 0.8724 0.5239 1.3964 0.8482 2.00
are from a single iteration, hence exposed to heavy bias from the random inputs (i.e. costs
and qualities).
6.2. Numerical Simulations
Having detailed the simulation’s input parameters and analysed a snapshot of the mech-
anism, we now present our numerical findings after simulating the mechanism for 105 times.
In Fig. 1 we summarise the behaviour of the our mechanism. It can be seen that for the
specific scenario we consider, it takes a relatively small sample precision i.e. sample of obser-
vations in data collection, for the outcome of our mechanism to be the same with outcome
of the second score auction under no uncertainty where agents report directly their realised
qualities.
In fact, after around 50 observations the winner of our auction is the winner of the second
score auction in more than 95% of the iterations of the mechanism (Fig. 1(a)). In addition
to this, our analytical findings in Section 5 are validated in Fig. 1(b), where we notice that
the selected agent’s expected utility increases as the precision of the samping increases. The
utility the winner of our auction expects to derive is less than the second score auction’s
winner expected utility (labelled as ’Second Score: Belief’), had it been able to generate and
report its belief of its quality freely. As it is expected, as the precision increases both auctions
approach the second score auction in a setting with no uncertainty where the winner can
report its actual production from the beginning (labelled as ’Second Score: Outcome’). The
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Figure 2: The selected agent’s percentage of winning the auction under no uncertainty and its expected
utility.
differences that appear are attributed to those cases where the winners of the two auctions
do not coincide, hence the winner faces losses.
The payment the selected agent expects to derive and is average costs for precision
θ ∈ [1, 100] are shown in Fig. 2. There is a clear effect of the penalties for inaccuracies, but
also of the principal’s compensation for the data collection costs in the expected payment
shown (Fig 2(a)). The expected payment for our mechanism starts lower than the two
benchmark auctions, but it increases as the precision increases. The lower payments for
both auctions based on agents’ beliefs are to be expected as they represent the cost of
uncertainty, while the higher payments will not be an issue in realistic applications since the
data collection cost tends to be significantly lower than the production costs; also note that
the payments’ differences are highlighted in the plot due to its scale. In fact, this issue is
related to the particular implementation of the simulations and not the mechanism itself,
since even after setting the upper bound of the cost collection parameter equal to 0.002 and
using a linear cost function, for relatively high precisions that cost ends up very close to
some agents’ production costs. We demonstrate this data sensitivity in Fig 2(b), where we
plot the logarithmic ratio of the production to the prediction costs.
7. Conclusions
There are many benefits attached to the rapid increase in the popularity of crowd-sourcing
platforms. However, before this technology can meet its full potential there are several issues
related to both crowd-sourcers and workers which must be addressed. For example, crowd-
sourcers rarely focus on anything else than the final cost of the project, while they also lack
the means to assess the workers, besides unsophisticated procedures such as discarding a
completed task. On the other hand, workers expecting minimum or circumstantial rewards
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Figure 3: The selected agents’ expected payment and average costs.
are inclined to dedicate the least of their time or other resources, if any at all, in completing
their tasks. Even in more complex tasks, with substantial rewards, crowd-workers may decide
to use a contract as a placeholder and bid for it without intending to honour it.
In this article we present a conceptual mechanism for addressing these challenges based
on a multi-dimensional procurement auction modified so it can address effectively workers’
strategic behaviour. The use of a multi-dimensional auctions allows crowd-sourcers to focus
on other elements of the workers’ output and therefore gives them incentives to improve them
while balancing the costs. Furthermore, we introduced uncertainty on how workers deter-
mine their production qualities by modelling them as probabilistic estimates, and assuming
that each worker generates a sample of independent estimates of the same precision. We
further depart from standard multi-dimensional approaches by denying the crowd-sourcer
of the ability to enforce truthful reporting of agents’ qualities through external means (i.e.
cancelling the auction or large arbitrary fines).
Initially the crowd-sourcer procures a task from the crowd by implementing a standard
second score auction, only now the workers’ ranking is calculated based on their reported
estimates of their qualities and costs. The winner of the auction receives the second score
payment and after it fulfils its part of the contract it receives a secondary payment based on
both the reported estimate and the actual production, production costs and costs involved
in generating the estimate. The secondary payment uses a strictly proper scoring rule to
evaluate the worker’s posterior belief of its quality once the task is finished and the crowd-
sourcer can witness the outcome.
We showed that the mechanism is immune to workers’ combined misreporting i.e. with
respect to the reported estimates of their outputs and the reported costs. In addition to that
we showed that they invest the maximum of the resources available to them when generating
that estimate, while individually rationality is maintained for the winner of the auction.
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However, there are some limitations regarding practical elements of the mechanism. Al-
though we proved analytically that the mechanism implements the same outcome with the
standard second score auction with the selected worker’s expected utility depending on its
true belief, numerical simulations demonstrated how sensitive the mechanism is to the pre-
diction of the worker’s quality, and hence on the resources invested in preparing its bid. The
importance of this issue is highlighted by observations which suggest that crowd-sourcers
may attempt to manipulate the workers’ restrictions during their preparation stage. Specif-
ically, in MTurk crowd-sourcers may attempt to manipulate the position of their task in the
search queries, in order to attract more workers and hence have the task completed faster
and for less money. This strategy can be effective, at least for the crowd-sourcers, given
that workers rarely browse after page 10 in the search results[9]. Although our mechanism
includes incentives for investing sufficient resources, it is only the winner of the auction who
is compensated with the cost of generating its estimate. To overcome these problems, work-
ers must be rewarded so they can participate in the mechanism, irrespective of if they win
or not. These rewards could be monetary or special privileges, such as moderator status,
cosmetic customisation or certificates of specialisation. Experience of the past combined
with the rate of advancements in internet based commerce suggests that these drawbacks
will be addressed.
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